Studia Humanitatis: Promises and Challenges by Buchholtz, Mirosława & Sibierska, Marta
Mirosława Buchholtz
Department of English, 
Nicolaus Copernicus University 
Miroslawa.Buchholtz@umk.pl
Marta Sibierska
Center for Language Evolution Studies (CLES); 
Department of English, Nicolaus Copernicus University 
marta.sibierska@gmail.com
Studia Humanitatis: Promises and Challenges
Abstract. In the Tower of Babel of today’s academe not so much languages 
as metaphors have been mixed. Although the division of knowledge into the humanities 
and the sciences is being increasingly contested in the wake of the failed attempt 
to bridge the gap by postmodernist scholars, the dividing line still lingers in popular 
imagination. In this context cognitive studies pursued by representatives of both 
parties and numerous disciplines within each arise as the real third space where 
the new lingua franca (in fact, lingua anglica) may allow scholars from various 
fields and cultural backgrounds to compare their understanding of metaphors and 
synergize their activities to achieve shared aims.
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1. Facts
The division of academic pursuits (both research and teaching) into 
the humanities and the sciences is a done deal. The respective merits 
of the two (reflected in college enrollment and research funding) have 
often been a matter of debate, which in recent years moved from the ivory 
towers of universities to the virtual and egalitarian space of the internet and 
became (as a result of the relocation) more and more subjective, though 
often pretending to offer verifiable knowledge (buttressed by examples, 
questionnaires, and statistics). Numerous bloggers keep themselves busy 
posing and answering practical questions of which degree is harder, 
which develops skills appreciated by employers, and which is more 
marketable. 
The news about the constructedness of knowledge (the internet itself 
is a prime example of constructedness that has got out of hand), seems 
to have spread unevenly, which only proves the reality of the Great Divide. 
Whereas the humanities (and the arts in particular) allowed themselves 
to be shaken by the wave of postmodernism, embracing deconstruction 
like a life saver (quite literally, the new mode of thinking made new 
publications and brilliant careers not only possible but also desirable) 
and readily giving up on objective reality in the open (and enjoyable) sea 
of doubt, the sciences seemed less willing to give up on certainties and turn 
away from their usual pursuits. The exception perhaps are theoreticians, 
whose task it is anyway and in any discipline to be on the lookout for 
new ideas, unencumbered by the pressure to turn them into marketable 
goods right away. The scientific obsession with nonlinearity, chaos and 
complexity in the last decades of the 20th-century, was no doubt an analogy 
to pomo symptoms in the humanities. 
2. Emotions
Pondering on intellectual ferment (was it really just a fad?) of that time, 
Michael Shermer recalls both the arrogance of humanist deconstructionists 
dismissing the 19th-century ideas of progress and the scientists’ reaction 
to it: haughty disregard or sly retaliation. He refers in particular to the physicist 
Alan D. Sokal’s bold spoof of what he saw as sheer postmodern nonsense 
and exposed as such by means of derisive imitation. In 1996 Sokal, who had 
just turned forty, published in the leftist New York journal Social Text his 
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article entitled “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative 
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity”, which he soon announced to be 
a hoax1. The text must have been convincing as a piece of scientific writing 
because of its denotative clarity that was rather uncommon in deconstructionist 
texts that proliferated at that time in various imitations of truly inspiring and 
ground-breaking thoughts of Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida or J. Hillis Miller. 
Respected editors of the respectably provocative journal sensed in Sobol 
a neophyte who was publicly admitting intellectual guidance, and they held 
out their hands to welcome him. 
One way of looking at the deconstructionist turn is to view it as 
an attempt on the part of the humanities to match the intricacy and painstaking 
documentation of both theory and experiment of the scientific method. 
The approval of and cooperation with scientists was devoutly sought. 
Extensive quotations and copious footnotes in Sokal’s “article” mercilessly 
expose the superficiality of the “scientific method” of humanists. That, 
however, was not the end of Sokal’s grievances against postmodernism. 
The numerous and lengthy footnotes along with the overlong list of works 
cited in his “contribution” were meant to expose the unspoken and yet widely 
known rules of the publishing game, which included quoting all the right 
names and pandering to current sensibilities (such as ethnicity, gender, 
politics, and frankophilia). In the late 1990s, when Sokal decided to ridicule 
postmodernism, it was anyway already in decline (though still sweeping 
through the provinces) and the desperate question was already becoming 
audible: What next? 
As for Sokal, he became famous enough to place with Oxford University 
Press a book patched up from reprints and chuck-full of cracker-barrel wisdom. 
It was published in 2008 under the title Beyond the Hoax, but it inevitably 
includes his main claim to fame, the notorious article, which in view of his 
later comments on philosophy and culture appears sad, as Jacques Derrida 
put it in response to the hoax2, rather than courageous. Sokal’s crotchety 
invasion of the territory of humanist thought in his essay collection of 2008 
 1 Copies of the issue are still in stock, but irretrievable from the journal’s website 
(https://www.dukeupress.edu/science-wars?viewby=title&sort=). 
 2 “This is all rather sad, don’t you think? For poor Sokal, to begin with. His name re-
mains linked to a hoax—‘the Sokal hoax,’ as they say in the United States—and not to scien-
tific work. Sad too because the chance of serious reflection seems to have been ruined, at least 
in a broad public forum that deserves better.” Read Derrida’s Response to the Sokal Affair. 
Posted by Eugene Wolters on: http://www.critical-theory.com/read-derridas-response-sokal-
affair/.
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testifies to his deep-rooted conviction that the scientist is equipped to deal 
with issues from beyond his field of research, and the humanist is not.
He is wrong, as Michael Bérubé proves in his Rhetorical Occasions: Essays 
on Humans and the Humanities (2006) and more recently Rens Bod shows 
in his A New History of the Humanities: The Search for Principles and 
Patterns from Antiquity to the Present (2013). The humanities are not (founded 
on) humbug. In his impeccably argued book, Bérubé separates the wheat 
from the chaff in Sokal-hoax and deplores in particular the inadequacy and 
the dead ends of the post-Sokal debate among humanists (2006: 57–58). 
Like Bérubé, though employing a different strategy, Bod erases the dividing 
line between the humanities and the sciences, showing that the habits (or 
virtues) usually attributed to the scientific mind, such as drawing hypotheses, 
abstract thinking, empiricism, rationality or skepticism have not only been 
used but were first of all invented centuries ago by the humanities. Bod’s 
book is what it promises to be – a history, meticulously assembling and 
cogently explicating not only the development of linguistics, historiography, 
philology, musicology, art history, logic, rhetoric and poetics, but also their 
transdisciplinary impact.
While changing the name of the humanities to “human sciences” or 
“scientia humanitatis” is hardly a consummation devoutly to be wished (such 
a wish would only prove the inferiority complex), it is crucial to remember 
that the humanities have an age-old tradition of intellectual rigor that need 
not shy comparison with the sciences. Dividing lines as such are not harmful 
unless they encourage oppositions, prejudice and derision, just as names are 
not harmful unless they are used to call people names. 
The division into the humanities and the sciences is replicated 
within the humanities themselves, leading to a comparable array 
of problems: isolationism, disdainful glances above the fence and lack 
of communication between various disciplines. Interdisciplinary research 
has been promoted in a variety of ways and become a fact especially in the 
sciences and those disciplines within the humanities that view themselves 
as scientific, most notably all subdisciplines of linguistics. The other 
humanists, if they choose to cooperate across disciplines and language/
culture boundaries usually call such studies “comparative.” Indeed, they are 
still at the stage of comparing fields of research, tools and methodologies. 
Genuine cooperation between historians, philosophers, literature and culture 
scholars is still burdened with doubt and reluctance, even though individual 
scholars evince the magpie habit of picking a phrase here and a reference 
there to embellish their own nest.
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3. Metaphors
The idea of nesting is indeed useful to illustrate tenuous relations between 
disciplines and their representatives. The biological instinct among 
animals to build a nest especially if they expect progeny may be seen 
as an archetype of the scholars, pregnant with ideas conceived by their 
minds, who construct mental homes for these ideas to incubate and hatch. 
The concept of “nesting” means something entirely different in computing, 
which disregards the connotations of breeding and focuses instead on the 
structure of the metaphorical nest, its layers and loops. Theoreticians 
of international relations also refer to “nesting” theories constructed with 
the aid of cognitive psychology with the aim of solving major global 
problems, but their understanding of the concept disregards the structure 
of the nest or the emotional aspect of individual breeding activities, stressing 
instead the function of the nest as the space of shared interests. 
Quite significantly, while explicating the ideas of Robert Jervis, 
Jack Snyder points to the animal world as a source of useful metaphors. 
He repeatedly refers to the example of “foxes who know many little things” 
and “are better at forecasting future events than are hedgehogs who know 
one big thing” (2013: 13). Not only in the context of international relations, 
though there in particular because the stakes are high, is it advisable, as he 
argues, to acquire and unite the habits of both fox and hedgehog (2013: 22–
23). On a self-reflexive note, he remarks that “[i]t is the job of academics 
to be hedgehogs, yet we know that this risks making us more cartoonish 
in our judgments than less theory-bound experts” (13). 
A biologist would hardly recommend that golden eagles, which build 
large nests, and bee hummingbirds, which are the smallest living birds, 
make a joint effort to construct homes for their progeny. A computer 
scientist, however, would probably consider technical feasibility of such 
a plan, whereas a theoretician of international relations might embrace 
the idea wholeheartedly, arguing that such cooperation would not only 
be possible but very welcome. Although we may be living by the same set 
of metaphors (including nest / nesting), our understanding of them varies 
considerably across the range of disciplines. The simplification resulting 
from metaphorical usage of polysemous words across disciplines inevitably 
leads to misunderstandings, or else – assuming at least some degree of good 
will – calls for discussion and negotiation. Another phenomenon – at once 
a promise and a challenge – is the rise to power of the unquestioned lingua 
franca, the English language, which is now used for scholarly purposes 
10 Mirosława Buchholtz, Marta Sibierska
worldwide. Its native, near-native or non-native use produces new dividing 
lines within disciplines, new hierarchies and new prejudices. 
The global polysemy and the classifying craze account for what 
in a famous essay entitled “Two Cultures”, C. P. Snow called “a gulf 
of mutual incomprehension – sometimes [...] hostility and dislike, but 
most of all lack of understanding” between the humanists and the scientists 
(1961: 4). These words were as valid in the 1950s and the 1960s, when Snow 
observed a deepening polarization of the Western discourse, as they are now. 
Whereas Snow envisioned a possibility of the third culture uniting the two 
opponents, John Brockman argues that the third culture (which is the title 
of the volume he edited in 1995) is not a bridge between the humanities and 
the sciences, but a promontory built by scientists to popularize their research 
among general public, including no doubt also humanists. In his recent 
book, co-edited with Stanisław Krajewski, Michał Heller raises objections 
to Brockman’s understanding of the third culture, and posits that physics 
practiced as art (rather than craft) belongs to the humanities (2014: 29). 
He claims that the mathematical-empirical method of exploring the world 
is arguably the science’s greatest discovery ever. It was romanticism that 
brought a wave of protest against the mechanistic view of the world 
embraced by modern physics (2014: 25). One may conclude that the division 
into scientists and humanists goes back to that time. It is quite telling that 
such luminaries of early romanticism as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe took 
an intense interest in science. However, the harsh criticism of his Farbenlehre 
(1810) in scientific circles testifies to the widening of the gulf in the early 
19th century. Heller points out, however, that today’s physics distances itself 
from a mechanistic view of the world, and has reached, in its own way and 
on its own terms, at least two aims proposed by romanticism: it created 
an image of the world as a whole and fulfilled the dream of universal language. 
Heller suggests, in other words, that the prerequisites for the genuine third 
culture uniting the humanities and the sciences do exist.
Voices calling for a change – any change, in fact – started to appear 
in the first decade of the 21st century. This concerned the humanities 
in general, but took a particularly dramatic, manifesto-like shape in the case 
of literary criticism. For instance, Louis Menand proffered “a bargain with 
the devil”: a marriage of his home field of study to evolutionary sciences 
as a way out of the crisis. 
In a 2009 interview, Joseph Carroll, the founding father of Darwinian 
Literary Studies, one of the seeds of that pact, stated that there are two ways 
for literary study to go: it “could continue to insist on disconnecting itself 
from empirically discernible facts about human nature and human cognition, 
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or it could realize that science is not a threat and a competitor but an ally in the 
quest for human understanding” (Carroll in DiSalvo 2009). The bargain with 
the devil seems promising; not only do the sciences offer a morale boost, 
but also a whole vast body of research on humans that has not so far been 
integrated into the humanities, though it has influenced some negotiations 
within them.
Importantly, one should not be misled to think that it is only 
the humanities that turn to the sciences for a helpful hand. In fact, the interest 
is reciprocal. Mathematicians are analysing narratives, searching for 
regularities and formulas (see e.g. Drożdż et al. 2016, a quantitative study 
of canonical literature that revealed multifractal mathematical patterns 
in its narrative structures); computer scientists are using big data stories 
corpora and algorithm programming to create screenplays that should appeal 
to the global public (see e.g. House of Cards Netflix TV series, which was 
created in this very way). This boom in interdisciplinary research initiatives 
yields new branches of disciplines, such as cognitive studies, a breakpoint 
seed of philosophy of mind complemented with biology. 
The synthesis of the two cultures starts specifically with accepting 
the central cognitivist idea: a definite disallowance of the Cartesian dualism 
of the body and the reason. Instead, with milestones such as Lakoff and 
Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980) or Johnson’s The Body in the Mind 
(1987), the mind has been anew anchored in the somatic sphere. The experience 
humans share, be it culturally transmitted through historiography or retold 
in literature, is always embodied, no matter how metaphysical it seems. 
Thus, of all the sciences, it is cognitive science that seems a most natural ally 
for the humanities in the times of crisis.
With this turn, humans lose something of their speciality that has been 
at the very core of the rise of the humanities. This trend of decentralisation 
is a pivotal point in the posthumanist turn in culture. Though cognitive studies 
as such do not share the assumptions of meta-, post-, or trans-humanist 
thought, by emboding human mind and, thus, human nature, they do, at least 
to a certain extent, augment the post-anthropocentric perspective. Human 
supremacy, now demystified by ethological observation, gene mapping, or 
neuroimaging, is not hereby replaced by a primacy of another type of beings, 
such as machines. But, still, it is degraded to an evolutionary “stroke 
of luck”. Such a re-positioning of a human being in contemporary culture 
is clearly evident, for example, in the case of a growing dissatisfaction with 
speciesism: the assumption that humans, solely on the basis of being Homo 
sapiens, are better than any other animals. In cognitively-oriented studies, 
Homo sapiens are not granted privileges; rather, they are deprived of them, 
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for instance when they are referred to not as ‘humans’, but ‘human animals’ 
(as opposed to ‘non-human animals’), classified according to their domain, 
kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species, while their actions 
are conceived more in terms of their biological and cognitive make-up than 
divine or idealistic inspirations. This results for instance in a tendency 
of the humanities to advert to the biological, the empirical, or the physical 
conceptual domains, which can be exemplified say with the animal metaphors 
used throughout this text. The very metaphor of a hedgehog and a fox, already 
alluded to above with the words of Jack Snyder, has been borrowed from 
Isaiah Berlin’s essay “The Hedgehog and the Fox. An Essay on Tolstoy’s 
View of History” (1953). It has in fact long been in use to designate two 
opposing strategies, in turns ascribed to artists, philosophers, politicians and 
scholars: persistence and cunningness. The story of the metaphor itself is old 
and complicated, but is comes down to the proverb, supposedly thought up 
by a Greek soldier (and a poet), Archilochus, who lived in the 7th century 
B. C., later cited by Erasmus: “Multa novit vulpes, verum echinus unum 
magnum (or, roughly, ‘The fox devises many strategies; the hedgehog knows 
one great and effective strategy’)” (Gould 2011: 2). Perhaps the biggest 
promise that the cognitivist paradigm offers is the wedding of the two.
4. Promises
The actual alliances between the humanities and the cognitivist paradigm 
diverge and take different forms; in the case of, for instance, literary studies, 
some attempts at integrating the two cultures commenced as early as in the 
1970s with the efforts of story grammarians (such as David Rumelhart). 
Concurrently, a number of literary scholars began to develop interest 
in memory studies, psychology or psychoaesthetics, combining them with 
literary criticism so as to analyse poetic devices or symbolic structures 
of texts in a new light, when in 1983 Reuven Tsur for the first time gave 
their efforts a name: cognitive poetics. Then, already in the 21st century, 
the interest stretched out from the issues of stylistics and reader response 
onto narrativity in various media (cognitive narratology), and later onto 
the issues of onto- and phylogenetic development of the cognitive capacities 
necessary for composing narratives in our species (a later version of Literary 
Darwinism).
The potentiality of cognitive reading of culture is clearly evident in each 
of the following texts, beginning with the study of human behaviour and its 
evolutionary aspects: the evolved and culturally transmitted stereotype and 
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prejudice cognition in the article by Marta Maj and Małgorzata Kossowska, 
and phylogenetic origins of literature in animal play explored in Marta 
Sibierska’s contribution. The cognitivist paradigm permeates into both 
pedagogy and historiographic research. A deepened focus on the mental 
processes is a case in point in Mirosław Pawlak’s text on teaching foreign 
language to adults and in Christopher Korten’s use of cognitive narratology 
in archival studies. 
The cognitive aspect is also crucial when analysing any cultural 
constructs and their transmission, as is the case in the comparative study 
of popular heroes in the past and today by Liliana Sikorska’s. Modernist 
writings, due to their authors’ interest in the workings of the mind and 
streams of consciousness, seem to be particularly well-suited to analyses 
from a cognitivist standpoint: whereas Ioana Zirra offers a re-reading 
of James Joyce’s Ulysses, focusing on inter- and intra-consciousness 
communication, cultural transmission, and memory studies, Verita 
Sriratana explores the issues of defamiliarisation and utopian mental spaces 
as constructed in Virginia Woolf’s playful biography Orlando. Mirosława 
Buchholtz discusses Caroline Levander’s book on current conceptualizations 
of American literature and its location in transcultural space. Grzegorz 
Koneczniak comments on the link between the cognitivist methodological 
apparatus and literary studies in Polish higher education units offering BA 
and MA programmes in cognitive studies. 
As the thematic scope of the texts included in this volume as well 
as the above outline of the cognitive approach show, it is not just the case that 
the interdisciplinary research is now giving rise to a new branch of sciences, 
such as cognitive literary studies, cognitive pedagogy, cognitive psychology, 
evolutionary psychology, experimental semiotics, and so on. It is, in fact, 
a manifestation of a much more expansive trend: “a little tale of victory 
for a particular fox and hedgehog” (Gould 2011: 262), a hybridisation 
of human complex composition with empirical verification and computable 
quantitative data. The question of what happens once the theses made so far 
by the humanist scholars are rigorously tested in a scientific regime remains 
open. 
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